

Common Property Resources

- TI: "Common Property" as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy
AU: Ciriacy-Wantrup,-S.-V.; Bishop,-Richard-C.a
SO: Natural-Resources-Journal; 15(4), Oct. 1975, pages 713-27.
- TI: Mitigating the Tragedy of the Commons
AU: Bell,-Frederick-W.
SO: Southern-Economic-Journal; 52(3), January 1986, pages 653-64.
- TI: Participatory Institutions: The Context of Common and Private Property Resources
AU: Chopra,-Kanchan; Kadekodi,-Gopal-K.
SO: Environmental-and-Resource-Economics; 1(4), 1991, pages 353-72.
- TI: State-Sponsored Violence as a Tragedy of the Commons: England's Privateering Wars with France and Spain, 1625-1630
AU: Conybeare,-John-A.-C.; Sandler,-Todd
SO: Public-Choice; 77(4), December 1993, pages 879-97.
AB: The 'tragedy of the commons' is the familiar problem that open access to a common property resource leads to overexploitation and to zero profits. A commons model is applied to an example of state sponsored private violence, the practice of privateering or licensed piracy. It is predicted that the presence of uncertainty about the value of the prey will reduce the amount of exploiting effort, and that industry profits may be positive due to both uncertainty and heterogeneous exploiters. Using data from England's wars with France and Spain between 1625 and 1630, the model suggests that the commons, represented by enemy merchant shipping, was not overexploited and that privateering profits were positive. The dynamic paths of privateering effort, ships seized, and individual firm profits were, however, consistent with the normal expectation that commons exploitation will peak and fall, as competition drives down returns through entry.
- TI: On Commons and Tragedies
AU: Cornes,-Richard; Sandler,-Todd
SO: American-Economic-Review; 73(4), September 1983, pages 787-92.
- TI: The Tragedy of the Commons?
AU: Dutta,-Prajit-K.; Sundaram,-Rangarajan-K.
SO: Economic-Theory; 3(3), July 1993, pages 413-26.
AB: We provide a complete characterization of the set of Markov-Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of dynamic common-property resource games a la Levhari and Mirman (1980). We find that all MPE of such games exhibit remarkably regular dynamic behavior. Surprisingly, however, and despite their memoryless nature, MPE need not result in a "tragedy of the commons", i.e., overexploitation of the resource relative to the first-best solutions. We show through an example that MPE could, in fact, lead to the reverse

phenomenon of underexploitation of the resource. Nonetheless, we demonstrate that, in payoff space, MPE are always suboptimal.

TI: Population Growth and the Decline of Common Property Resources in Rajasthan, India

AU: Jodha,-N.-S.

SO: *Population-and-Development-Review*; 11(2), June 1985, pages 247-64.

TI: The Real Tragedy of the Commons: Livestock Production in Kwazulu

AU: Lyne,-M.-C.; Nieuwoudt,-W.-L.

SO: *South-African-Journal-of-Economics*; 58(1), March 1990, pages 88-96.

TI: Challenges to proponents of common property resource systems: despairing voices from the social forests of Zimbabwe

AU: Campbell, Bruce, Alois Mando ndo, Nontokozo Nemarundwe, Bevlyne Sithole, Wil de Jong, Marty Luckert and Frank Matose

SO: *World Development*, 29(4): 2001, 589-600.

AB: There is a fair degree of misplaced optimism about common property resource (CPR) management. In investigating common property issues for woodlands in communal areas in Zimbabwe, we are struck by the numerous case studies showing a breakdown of local institutions for CPR management, and the lack of any emerging alternative institutions for such management. There are a number of contributing economic, social and ecological factors to this phenomenon. We argue that the formal rule-based systems that form the cornerstones of the proposed CPR systems are far removed from the current institutional systems, rooted in norm-based controls. We suggest that advocacy of CPR systems has to be tempered with critical analysis.

TI: A Common Property Experiment with a Renewable Resource

AU: Hazlett,-Denise

SO: *Economic-Inquiry*; 35(4), October 1997, pages 858-61.

AB: This series of three classroom experiments demonstrates the tragedy of the commons and suggests two possible solutions: communication and individual property rights. In the first and second experiments, students jointly own a renewable resource in the form of a plate of M&Ms. Communication is not allowed in the first experiment, whereas in the second experiment students may try to influence each other's desired harvest. The third experiment divides the plate to establish individual property rights.

TI: Tragedy of the Commons: The Meaning of the Metaphor

AU: Vandermeer,-John

SO: *Science-and-Society*; 60(3), Fall 1996, pages 290-306.

AB: The tragedy of the commons has been an influential metaphor in the environmental movement, not only referring to the misappropriation of common property resources by private producers, but also incorporating a variety of other issues into the metaphorical commons. Criticisms of the thesis have concentrated on the facts of how humans manage classical common property resources in the real world. Yet the most

provocative aspects of the metaphor are associated with its more general usage for resources not usually thought of as manageable common property resources. A full analysis of the tragedy of the commons reveals important political insights into the environmental consequences of capitalism, especially the tendency for externalization of many production costs, suggesting that a more appropriate title for the thesis might be the tragedy of the privately owned sheep.

TI: Common property resources and then poor: findings from West Bengal

AU: Beck, Tony, Ghosh, Madan G

SO: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 2000, 35(3): 147-153.

AB: This article reports on a seven-village study of common property resources (CPRs) carried out between 1993 and 1996 from across the agroecological zones of West Bengal. Among our findings are: CPRs made up about 12 per cent of poor households' income; fuel and fodder were the most important CPRs accessed by the poor; and women and girls are mainly responsible for collection of CPRs, which may be why their importance to the poor is largely ignored. Poor people are being systematically excluded from customary access to CPRs, a key element in their livelihoods, at an alarming rate. The main causes of this exclusion are agricultural intensification, commoditisation of CPRs, environmental degradation and population growth. New forms of 'community' management of environmental resources, which have been promoted by governments and aid donors over the last 10 years, may add to the exclusion of the poor.

TI: Common Property and Collective Action in Economic Development

AU: Runge,-Carlisle-Ford

SO: *World-Development*; 14(5), May 1986, pages 623-35.

TI: The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?

AU: Tornell,-Aaron; Velasco,-Andes

SO: *Journal-of-Political-Economy*; 100(6), December 1992, pages 1208-31.

AB: The authors analyze a differential game in which all interest groups have access to a common capital stock. They show that the introduction of a technology that has inferior productivity but enjoys private access may ameliorate the tragedy of the commons. The authors use this model to analyze capital flight: in many poor countries, property rights are not well defined; since "safe" bank accounts in rich countries (the inferior technology) are available to citizens of these countries, they engage in capital flight. They show that the occurrence of capital flight does not imply that opening the capital account reduces growth and welfare.

TI: Symposium on Management of Local Commons

AU: Bardhan,-Pranab

SO: *Journal-of-Economic-Perspectives*; 7(4), Fall 1993, pages 87-92.

TI: The Commons, Common Property, and Environmental Policy

AU: Bromley,-Daniel-W.

SO: *Environmental-and-Resource-Economics*; 2(1), 1992, pages 1-17.

TI: Determinants and impact of local institutions for common resource management

AU: Heltberg, Rasmus

SO: *Environment and Development Economics*, 2001,6:183-208.

AB: In this article, local institutions for forest conservation and management are analysed. The discussion is based on data from 37 villages and 180 households randomly sampled from a protected area in Rajasthan, India. Local management institutions are described, factors affecting inter- village differences in management institutions and collective action are analysed in a logit model, and the impact of institutions and other variables on common resource dependency and forest outcomes is tested using instrumental variable regression. Village population size has a positive effect and prior institutional experience a negative effect on the probability of collective action. It is concluded that efforts at improving forest management should not be confined to the poorest farmers. Large landowners are heavily involved in degrading use practices, especially when resources have good market potential. Local management institutions play a positive role in the area, but their impact appears insufficient to safeguard forests and commons from continued degradation. Conservation policies should target win-win options through interventions aimed at improving technologies for private and common lands as well as institutional changes.

TI: Management of Common Property Resources: Limits to Voluntary Collective Action

AU: Murty,-M.-N.

SO: *Environmental-and-Resource-Economics*; 4(6), December 1994, pages 581-94.

TI: Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design

AU: Seabright,-Paul

SO: *Journal-of-Economic-Perspectives*; 7(4), Fall 1993, pages 113-34.

TI: The Management of Common Property Resources: Collective Action as an Alternative to Privatisation or State Regulation

AU: Wade,-Robert

SO: *Cambridge-Journal-of-Economics*; 11(2), June 1987, pages 95-106.

AB: When will villagers cooperate to supply themselves with goods and services that they all need but could not provide for themselves individually? When will those who face a potential "tragedy of the commons" organize a system of rules by which the tragedy is averted? Many writers are pessimistic about the chances of such cooperation, some favoring privatization, others favoring state control. This paper shows that the analytical basis for this pessimism is weak in many situations of village-based common property resource use. It then suggests a number of factors on which the chances of successful collective action depend.

TI: The Management of Common Property Resources: Finding a Cooperative Solution

AU: Wade,-Robert

SO: *World-Bank-Research-Observer*; 2(2), July 1987, pages 219-34.

TI: Market Success or Community Failure? Common Property Resources in Colonial North India and a Case Illustration from a Cluster
AU: Chakravarty-Kaul,-Minoti
SO: Indian-Economic-and-Social-History-Review; 36(3), July-Sept. 1999, pages 355-87.

TI: Tragedy of the commons and comedy of common property resources
AU: Damodaran, A.
SO: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 26(38): 1991, pages 2213-2215.

TI: Rural common property resources: contributions and crisis
AU: Jodha, N. S.
SO: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 25(26): 1990, pages A65 – A78.

Title: Common property resources and the environmental context: role of biophysical versus social stresses

Author: Jodha, N. S.

Source: *Economic and Political Weekly*,30(51):1995, pages 3278-3283.

Abstract: This paper deals with common property resources (CPRs) as a part societal response to high risk-low productivity environment in the dry region of India and the decline CPRs under changing social and institutional circumstances despite their unchanged bio-physical context, leading to degradation of a community asset and erosion of environment-friendly survival option for the people.

TI: Coming tragedy of the commons
AU: Shiva, Vandana
SO: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 21(15):1986, pages 613-614.

TI: Common property resources and rural poor in dry regions of India
AU: Jodha, N. S.

SO: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 21(27): 1986, pages 1169-1181.

AB: Common Property Resources (CPR's), through neglected by policy makers and planners, play a significant role in the life of rural poor. This Paper, part of larger study on the role of CPRs in farming systems of dry areas of India, attempts to quantify the extent of which the rural poor benefit from CPRs. Based on the data from over 80 villages in 21 districts in dry regions of seven states, the study reveals significant contribution of CPRs towards the employment and income generating for rural poor, ie, labour and small farm households. The dependence of richer households on CPRs is much less.

Despite such contributions of CPRs, their area and productivity are declining in all the regions. The area of CPRs has declined by 26 to 63 percent during last three decades. Large-scale privatisation of CPR has taken place mainly during the last three decades. The privatisation of CPRs was done largely to help the poor. However 49-86 percent of the privatized CPR ended up in the hands of non-poor in different areas. Furthermore, most of the land received by the poor households was also given up by them as they did not have complementary resources to develop and use the newly received lands. Thus, the rural poor collectively lost a significant part of the source of their sustenance through

the decline of CPRs. This loss does not seem to be compensated by privatized CPR lands given to (or retained by) them. The situation calls for greater attention to CPRs as a part of the anti-poverty strategy.

TI: Poverty and common property resources : case study of a rope making industry

AU: Johri, Alok, N. Krishnakumar

SO: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 26(47): 1991, pages 2897-2902

AB: There is a growing awareness of the significant role played by Common Property Resources (CPR) in income and employment generation among rural poor. Recent literature has focused on attempt to harness these resources for poverty alleviation programmes as well as the progressive usurpation of these resources by the state. This paper is a study of rope making industry of the villages of Saharanpur district, UP. The proposition that producers in cottage industries are chained to their poverty by the inefficient technology in use is clearly validated by the evidence from this industry.

TI: CPRs and rural poor: a micro level analysis

AU: Pasha, Syed Ajmal

SO: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 27(46): 1992, pages 2499-2503.

TI: People's participation and common property resources

AU: Chopra, Kanchan, Gopal K. Kadekodi, M. N. Murty

SO: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 24(51-52): 1989, pages A189-195.

AB: Through relevant in a wide spectrum of situations, participatory management is becoming increasingly pertinent in the management of common property resources. While historically ownership and management of these resources rested with the state government failure to preserve common property resources together with their excessive exploitation for development has led to serious degradation of the environment with the attendant ecological repercussions. Under people's participation as an alternative, the beneficiary/client groups are made responsive to the cost of preservation. Such a system makes development with preservation possible and renders the assumed trade-off between development and preservation non-operational.

TI: Privatisation of common property resources: lessons from rural Karnataka

AU: Karanth, G. K.

SO: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 27(31-32): 1992, pages 1680-1688.

AB: This paper examines the experience of privatizing common property resources (CPRs) over a period of 50-100 years in one village. The two main questions addressed here are: How does the process of privatization of CPRs take place? Who benefits from such a process?

The Study of a single village provides the opportunity to understand the dynamics involved over a period of time. The village under study here is Rajapura in Magadi taluk of Bangalore (rural) district in Karnataka.

Title: Common property resources: Two case studies

Author: Bon, Emmanuel

Source: *Economic and Political Weekly*, 35(28-29): 2000, pages 2569-2573.

Abstract: Through two field studies in Himachal Pradesh, this article examines the management of three types of common property resources – communal forests, grazing lands and gravity flow irrigation systems

TI: Moral Ecological Rationality, Institutions and the Management of Common Property Resources

AU: Cleaver,-Frances

SO: *Development-and-Change*; 31(2), March 2000, pages 361-83.

AB: This article considers theories of collective action in relation to the management of communal water resources in Nkayi District, Zimbabwe. Taking a critical view of institutional explanations of common property resource management, it illustrates how the addition of social theory can enrich such approaches. The prevalence of rational choice premises in defining the problem of collective action and the persuasiveness of institutionalism in apparently offering solutions to it is questioned. The article rejects simple evolutionary theorizing about institutions in favour of an embedded approach that allows for complexity, for the social and historical location of collective action and for an examination of the interface between agent and structure. It is argued here that collective management of water supplies does exist but that it is more partial, changeable and evolving and less attributable to single factors than suggested in much of the literature.

TI: When 'Community' Is Not Enough: Managing Common Property Natural Resources in Rural South Africa

AU: Ainslie,-Andrew

SO: *Development-Southern-Africa*; 16(3), Spring 1999, pages 375-401.

AB: Common property natural resource management (NRM) in former "bantustan" rural areas can provide important pointers for current and future land reform and local government policy. Using Tyefu Location in the Eastern Cape as a case study, this article outlines three of the constraints that currently fashionable "community-based" NRM models are likely to face in coordinating the use of common property resources in these areas. These three constraints are first, the entrenched socio-economic differentiation that results in local people having varied, but generally weak incentives for contributing to collective action resource management. Second, are the high levels of institutional contestation that exist in these areas and third, the fact that the "fuzziness" of existing NRM regimes allows for maximum flexibility in resource use, with the result that most rural (and urban-based) people are unlikely to support the introduction of more formalised NRM regimes.

TI: Market Success or Community Failure? Common Property Resources in Colonial North India and a Case Illustration from a Cluster

AU: Chakravarty-Kaul,-Minoti

SO: *Indian-Economic-and-Social-History-Review*; 36(3), July-Sept. 1999, pages 355-87.

TI: Essays on Common Property Resources with Applications to Forestry and Global Warming

AU: Narain,-Urvashi

SO: University of California, Berkeley, Ph.D. 1998

TI: The Impact of Changes in Common Property Resource Management on Intrahousehold Allocation

AU: Maggs,-Philip; Hoddinott,-John

SO: Journal-of-Public-Economics; 72(2), May 1999, pages 317-24.

AB: In developing countries, common property resources (CPRs) can be an important source of income for certain individuals within households. This paper demonstrates that if changes in the management of CPRs impose fixed costs on them, or cause a decline in the prices of goods produced from it, the intrahousehold allocation of resources may alter in a manner detrimental to those individuals. The paper also shows that the assumption of a unitary household model causes the detrimental effects of certain CPR policy interventions to be overlooked. Although the model is narrowly conceived, the results can be generalized to examples where households have members who specialize in different economic activities outside the home.

TI: Women, Common Property Resources and Livestock Husbandry in Thai Villages

AU: Kehren,-Tatjana

SO: International-Journal-of-Social-Economics; 26(1-2-3), 1999, pages 370-88.

AB: In many Asian countries, women play a significant but varying role in the management of livestock and the use of common resources plays an important role in animal husbandry, and can affect the health of some types of livestock. This paper concentrates on village livestock in Thailand and makes use of survey data as well as national statistics. It first of all outlines the nature and development of livestock industries in Thailand. It then considers the role which women play in the village livestock economy in relation to cattle and buffalo, particularly dairying, and in the keeping of poultry and pigs. The extent to which women are involved in maintaining the health of livestock is considered. Both village bovines and poultry utilise common property resources to a considerable extent in Thailand. This has implications for the economics and productivity of keeping village livestock, the healthiness of such livestock and the spread of livestock diseases.

TI: Determinants of Cooperation and Management of Local Common Property Resources: Discussion

AU: Bromley,-Daniel-W.

SO: American-Journal-of-Agricultural-Economics; 80(3), August 1998, pages 665-68.

TI: Agricultural Intensification, Common Property Resources and the Farm-Household

AU: Lopez,-Ramon

SO: Environmental-and-Resource-Economics; 11(3-4), April-June 1998, pages 443-58.

TI: Nationalisation, Privatisation and the Dilemmas of Common Property Management in Western Rajasthan

AU: Shanmugaratnam,-N.

SO: Journal-of-Development-Studies; 33(2), December 1996, pages 163-87.

AB: Since 1949, the Indian state of Rajasthan has experienced a series of land reforms and other policy interventions which tended to disregard the institutional needs of natural resource management in general and common property resource management in particular. Nationalisation of land and the creation of modern forms of private property for agricultural expansion along with rising population densities have caused continuous decline in availability of common property resources and undermined possibilities for collective action in the arid zone of Rajasthan which occupies a major part of the state. This article reviews the problem of common property resources management in Rajasthan's arid zone from a historical-institutional perspective and provides a microanalysis based on a household survey in two sets of villages. It concludes by highlighting the current dilemmas of common property resource management and indicating possible directions for policy intervention.

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AU: Vandermeer,-John

SO: Science-and-Society; 60(3), Fall 1996, pages 290-306.

AB: The tragedy of the commons has been an influential metaphor in the environmental movement, not only referring to the misappropriation of common property resources by private producers, but also incorporating a variety of other issues into the metaphorical commons. Criticisms of the thesis have concentrated on the facts of how humans manage classical common property resources in the real world. Yet the most provocative aspects of the metaphor are associated with its more general usage for resources not usually thought of as manageable common property resources. A full analysis of the tragedy of the commons reveals important political insights into the environmental consequences of capitalism, especially the tendency for externalization of many production costs, suggesting that a more appropriate title for the thesis might be the tragedy of the privately owned sheep.

TI: Management of Common Property Resources: Limits to Voluntary Collective Action

AU: Murty,-M.-N.

SO: Environmental-and-Resource-Economics; 4(6), December 1994, pages 581-94.

TI: Productivity Measurement in Common Property Resource Industries: An Application to the Pacific Coast Trawl Fishery

AU: Squires,-Dale

SO: Rand-Journal-of-Economics; 23(2), Summer 1992, pages 221-36.

AB: This article measures total factor productivity in industries that exploit resources held in common. Particular attention is paid to the valuation and specification of in situ common-property resources in a neoclassical production technology, catchability of the resource, and variations in economic capacity utilization. An empirical analysis of the open-access Pacific coast trawl fishing industry demonstrates that disentangling the

productivity residual from changes in resource abundance, its catchability, and variations in capacity utilization hones the productivity residual to finer precision, lowering mean productivity growth by about half. Removing biological noise from highly variable resources is also important. The results are related to a program limiting the number of vessels and can contribute to sustainable resource management whenever resources are held in common.

TI: Effiziente Nutzung und Regulierung von Allmendegutern. (Efficient Exploitation and Control of Common Property Resources. With English summary.)

AU: Wagner,-Thomas

SO: Jahrbucher-fur-Nationalokonomie-und-Statistik; 208(4), July 1991, pages 385-98.

AB: This article summarizes the proposition about inefficiency in the exploitation of common and communal property. Changing the premisses efficiency becomes possible regarding economies of scale, imperfect competitive markets, or non-Nash behavior. For communal property there are trigger strategy equilibria. An optimal number of firms exists when the exploiters experience sunk costs. One reason for inefficiency is the budget-balancing constraint. Group penalties, a Pigou-tax, and quota systems break the budget constraint and restore efficiency. Unlike group penalties the efficacy of Pigou-tax and tradable rights depend on the number of participants and their premised Nash-behavior.

TI: Tenure Policy toward Common Property Natural Resources in Sub-Saharan Africa

AU: Lawry,-Steven-W.

SO: Natural-Resources-Journal; 30(2), Spring 1990, pages 403-22.

AB: This article considers problems in improving the management of common property natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa. Poor management is often attributed to obtrusive state policies which have undercut local institutions. Some recent policy studies conclude that authority over resources should be devolved to local authorities or user groups. This paper argues that, while state management is ineffective, incentives for individuals to participate in local management activities are weak, and local institutions are usually unable to generate sufficient sanction locally to enforce rules. Short-term policies are suggested for strengthening the respective weaknesses of states and communities through "co-management" arrangements.

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AU: Wade,-Robert

SO: Cambridge-Journal-of-Economics; 11(2), June 1987, pages 95-106.

AB: When will villagers cooperate to supply themselves with goods and services that they all need but could not provide for themselves individually? When will those who face a potential "tragedy of the commons" organize a system of rules by which the tragedy is averted? Many writers are pessimistic about the chances of such cooperation, some favoring privatization, others favoring state control. This paper shows that the analytical basis for this pessimism is weak in many situations of village-based common property resource use. It then suggests a number of factors on which the chances of successful collective action depend.

TI: The Management of Common Property Resources: Finding a Cooperative Solution
AU: Wade,-Robert
SO: World-Bank-Research-Observer; 2(2), July 1987, pages 219-34.

TI: Common Property Resources, Storage Facilities and Ownership Structures: A Cournot Model of the Oil Market
AU: Sinn,-Hans-Werner
SO: Economica; 51(23), August 1984, pages 235-52.

TI: Population Growth and the Decline of Common Property Resources in Rajasthan, India
AU: Jodha,-N.-S.
SO: Population-and-Development-Review; 11(2), June 1985, pages 247-64.

TI: Fisheries, Extended Jurisdiction and the Economics of Common Property Resources
AU: Munro,-Gordon-R.
SO: Canadian-Journal-of-Economics; 15(3), August 1982, pages 405-25.

TI: Technological Externalities and Common-Property Resources: An Empirical Study of the U. S. Northern Lobster Fishery
AU: Bell,-Frederick-W.
SO: Journal-of-Political-Economy; 80(1), Jan.-Feb. 1972, pages 148-58.

TI: An Optimal Program for Managing Common Property Resources with Congestion Externalities
AU: Brown,-Gardner, Jr.
SO: Journal-of-Political-Economy; 82(1), Jan.-Feb. 1974, pages 163-73.

TI: Cooperative Control of International Pollution and Common Property Resources
AU: Markusen,-James-R.
SO: Quarterly-Journal-of-Economics; 89(4), Nov. 1975, pages 618-32.

TI: Production and Trade from International Common Property Resources
AU: Markusen,-James-R.
SO: Canadian-Journal-of-Economics; 9(2), May 1976, pages 309-19.

TI: Common pool resource appropriation under costly cooperation
AU: Mc Carthy, Nancy, E. Sadoulet and Alain de Janvry
SO: Journal of Environmental Economics and management, 42(3):2001, pages 297-309.
AB: In addition to the usual fixed costs, we introduce variable costs in a community's effort to cooperate in extracting from a common pool resource. Using a standard supervision mechanism, these variable costs are shown to be an increasing function of individual members' incentives to default. The model explains why we frequently observe communities that all cooperate and have relatively similar resource endowments, and yet achieve very different levels of extraction.

